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Abstract This article aims to investigate the relation between Euro membership and inflation. We construct 
two models that explain inflation using nonmonetary variables. To estimate these models, we collect yearly 
panel data for the 28 members of the European Union from 1998 to 2016. Due to the problem of endogeneity 
associated with some variables, we use the panel GMM following Arellano and Bond (1991) to perform 
all estimations. Results for the estimations of coefficients do not indicate a relation between membership 
in the Eurozone and inflation rates, neither for the short nor long term. Thus, the results can be considered 
contra-evidence for statements that the Euro increases short term inflation of its new members or that it 
reduces long term inflation rates permanently.
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I. Introduction
Membership in currency unions is usually marketed with promises of lower inflation rates. 
However, the general public in Euro countries complained about price hikes with the introduction 
of the common currency (Shiamptanis, 2010). In Germany, for example, this could be observed 
in the so-called TEURO summits at the highest political levels1). However, after the introduction 
of the Euro, even though the perceived inflation increased, official figures for it were not 
considerably higher than in prior years (Jungermann et al., 2007). The perception of higher 
inflation might have discouraged other countries from joining the Eurozone (EZ).
This article aims to identify the overall short and long term effects of EZ membership on 
inflation rates. Thus, our study contributes to the discussion on price impacts of membership 
in currency unions and serves as a possible guideline for countries that are uncertain about 
joining the EZ, are already members of the EZ and discussing a possible exit, and are planning 
to share a currency, such as the nascent common currency areas in Africa.
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Conforming to the criteria of Mundell (1961), there are many studies questioning if the 
EZ can be considered as an optimal currency area and also questioning the viability of the 
Euro without a complete fiscal federalism among its member countries (Dreyer & Schmid, 
2015; Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen & Yosha, 2001; Kenen, 1995; Krugman, 1991, 1993). Others 
try to measure the impacts of membership in the European Union (EU) or Eurozone (EZ) 
on trade (Baldwin, 1992; Baldwin & Taglioni, 2007; Berger & Nitsch, 2008; Bun & Klaassen, 
2002, 2007; Rose, 2000). Meanwhile, some others investigate the effects of EU/EZ membership 
on economic growth (Badinger, 2005; Crespo Cuaresma et al., 2008; Dreyer & Schmid, 2017; 
Henrekson et al., 1997; Landau, 1995; Mann, 2015; Vanhoudt, 1999). Very few articles study 
the overall effects of EZ membership on inflation. 1)
Studies on this issue have common conclusions. For example, Shiamptanis (2010) found 
evidence of a structural break in inflation rates for countries that joined the EZ in 1999. He 
identified higher inflation rates just after the Euro’s introduction relative to prior periods. This 
structural break was also identified in Latvia by Cavallo et al. (2015), who used an international 
store chain operating within the country to show that prices were adjusted to German levels 
after the introduction of the Euro.
In the long term, however, membership in a currency union is associated with lower inflation 
rates and synchronization (Cham, 2011; Kishor & Ssozi, 2010). As stated by Windberger and 
Zeileis (2014), this is observed for the EZ, where the decrease in mean inflation rates took 
place with a sharp reduction of skewness, i.e., by synchronization of rates in the run-up to 
the EZ and decreasing rates in previously higher inflation countries. However, according to 
Duarte (2003) and Hall and Lagoa (2014), EZ members experienced diverging inflation rates 
in the first years of the Euro2).
Some further articles study inflation rates in the EZ (Angeloni & Ehrmann, 2007; Altissimo 
et al., 2011; Hristov et al., 2014). However, these articles focus on the explanation of inflation 
differentials within EZ members and not directly on the relationship between EZ membership 
and inflation. Angeloni and Ehrmann (2007) show that inflation differentials have been falling 
sharply during the 1990s and stabilized already before the Euro adoption in 1999. Thus, for 
the 28 members of the EU, the tendency of decreasing inflation rates was already present.
Comparing inflation rates of EZ members before and after 1999 and concluding that EZ 
membership permanently decreases inflation rates may be questionable because these rates also 
decreased for other EU countries that did not join the common currency from the beginning. 
So, in contrast to the literature, this article assumes a structural break in inflation rates during 
the 1990s and does not use data before 1998. Doing so it avoids the study of short term hikes 
in prices for the 1999 EZ entrants, which was analyzed and confirmed by the literature.
1) In the word Teuro, the prefix “T” means teuer, German word for expensive.
2) For a summary of the literature on inflation effects of membership of currency unions, see Appendix 1.
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We model inflation with different nonmonetary variables such as GDP growth, unemployment 
rates, government spending, investment, total government debt, current account balance, and 
balance of the government budget as proposed by other articles (Cottarelli et al., 1998; Fakher, 
2016; Hammermann & Flanagan, 2009). We use two different dummy variables to account 
for two possible effects of EZ membership on inflation.
An announcement dummy, which assumes the value of one during the years before joining 
the Euro, measures the short term level effect in prices due to joining the EZ. One to three 
years prior the date of membership are used to account for people’s expectations of joining 
the Euro.
A membership dummy, which assumes the value of one when a country is officially a member 
of the EZ, measures the long term effect of membership on inflation rates in comparison to 
countries that are not members.
Two different models that explain inflation are used. In the first, all aforementioned variables 
are included. However, some variables such as government spending can be seen as a channel 
by which Euro membership affects inflation because part of what is spent by the government 
could be influenced or restricted by membership. Thus, regressing inflation with a membership 
dummy while simultaneously controlling for these channel variables, could be problematic. One 
could ask which effect on inflation is left for the dummy variable, when all these channel 
variables are included. Therefore, estimations without these variables are rerun.
Due to the problem of endogeneity associated with these variables (see Dreyer & Schmid, 
2017), we used the linear generalized method of moments (GMM), also known as difference 
GMM (Arellano & Bond, 1991). We collected yearly data from Eurostat, OECD, and the 
International Monetary Fund from 1998 to 2016 for all 28 countries3).
The results do not provide evidence of increases in prices due to joining the Euro after 
1999 (short term effects) as both of our models do not suggest that Euro announcements lead 
to general level effects in prices. When analyzing the difference in inflation associated to 
membership (long term effects), the models provide no evidence that Euro members have lower 
inflation rates compared to nonmembers.
The outline of the paper is as follows: Section 2 formulates our models; Section 3 provides 
estimation results, and Section 4 concludes.
II. Modeling Inflation
To model inflation, we follow the literature on nonmonetary variables that are used to explain 
3) For more details on our data, see Appendix 2.
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it (Cottarelli et al., 1998; Hammermann & Flanagan, 2009; Fakher, 2016).
Typically, in the short term, higher real GDP growth is associated with higher inflation. 
The explanation for this is that higher growth is often driven by high growth in aggregate 
demand that induces growth in aggregate output and higher prices (Motley, 1998; Den Haan, 
2000). To proxy this possible effect, we use the real growth of GDP as determinant of inflation 
rates. In contrast, if output expands faster than income, there is less pressure on the prices 
of goods and services. With this in mind, we also use the investment share of a country’s 
GDP as an independent variable. The higher the level of investments, the higher should the 
change in aggregate supply of goods and services be, and, thus, the lower the inflation rates.
Unemployment could have two different effects on inflation. When unemployment rates are 
high and consumers have lower purchasing power, the inflation pressure should decrease. 
Additionally, the labor supply’s negotiating power in wage setting is limited and provides less 
pressure on prices due to lower labor cost increases. Conversely, when unemployment is high, 
authorities may be tempted to make monetary expansions, even though agents anticipate this 
expansion and its effects on unemployment rates may be limited. This is sufficient to increase 
inflation rates. For the EU region and time frame of this study, we expect that higher 
unemployment rates should correlate with lower inflation. This should be true even for EU 
members that still have their own monetary policies since they have restrictive targets for 
inflation rates and little room for monetary expansions (Cottarelli et al., 1998).
In the case of the current account balance, the higher the deficit in current accounts, the 
higher one should expect the inflation rate. This occurs from governments devaluating their 
currencies to solve problems in their balance of payments. When a country has a current account 
deficit, its currency should lose value against foreign currencies. This exchange rate depreciation 
is seen as an automatic adjustment to the balance of payments. With a depreciated currency, 
prices tend to increase in domestic currency units. Thus, the higher the surplus in current account, 
the lower we expect the inflation rate. This reasoning is valid for non-EZ members, as long 
they still have their monetary policies4) (Cottarelli, 1998).
The balance of government budget, its total debt, and its total spending are used as explanatory 
variables. There are two reasons for using these variables: (1) For non-EZ countries, governments 
that have high deficits in their budgets, high amounts of debt, or simply spend too much may 
be tempted to solve part of their problems with inflation (seigniorage). (2) For all countries, 
there is also an inflationary effect of public spending if governments spend inefficiently or 
keep high expenditures during a period of income growth above the growth of output. For 
these reasons, we assume that the higher the deficit in the government budget, government 
4) We decided to still include this variable, because it was possible during the time frame of our analysis to observe 
strong movements of exchange rates from non-EZ members against the Euro. However, we decided not to include 
openness of the economy because we believe that the facility for international trade in EU countries is very 
even, and, thus, this variable would not have a strong explanatory power of inflation.
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spending, and total debt, the higher the inflation (Hammermann and Flanagan, 2009).
These variables construct the first version of our model:
           (1)
where  is the natural log of inflation for country i in year t,  is the annual real growth 
rate of GDP, and U is unemployment rate. The variables INV, S, Cur, DEBT, and GOV refer 
to investment, balance of government budget, balance of current account, total size of public 
debt, and government spending, respectively, and are presented in percentage terms of each 
country’s GDP.
The effect of EZ membership is further measured on inflation by using the dummy variable 
EZ. Thus, if EZ membership has a permanent effect on inflation, β8 should be significant. 
The EZ dummy, however, does not account for short term effect on domestic prices, which 
may occur when a country announces to join the common currency. To deal with this possible 
effect, we also include the dummy variable Ann in the model, which assumes the value of 
one in the 3 years preceding the Euro adoption and zero otherwise. Since one could argue 
that the choice of 3 years for the announcement variable may be arbitrary, we also ran estimations 
assuming an announcement period of one and two years.
One may argue that there is empirical evidence (Cottarelli et al., 1998) that inflation is 
sometimes affected by past observations of our independent variables. Therefore, we could 
rewrite Eq. (1) including their lags. For example, past investment is expected to influence 
inflation negatively, while the opposite is expected for past inflation. Because of that, coefficients 
associated to these variables are expected to be negative and positive, respectively. However, 
variables such as unemployment, current account balance, government spending, and total 
domestic debt present a strong time series autocorrelation (correlations equal 0.93, 0.90, 0.95, 
and 0.97, respectively). These variables in one period can be considered good proxies for 
themselves in the subsequent period, because they typically do not vary tremendously in the 
short term. Thus, their inclusion in two time periods in Eq. (2) would not add information 
to the model but inflate the variance of our estimations. Moreover, such a high autocorrelation 
between two variables would lead the correlation matrix to singularity and, thus, it would not 
be inversible, making GMM estimations impossible. To cope with this, these variables are used 
without their lags. We are careful not to include the lag of GDP growth in the model, since 
this effect, if present, should be only found in the short term.
To correct possible autoregressive effects of our dependent variable inflation, we also add 
its lag of order 1. In this case, the idea of adding past inflation to the model is to control 
for a possible “inertial inflation” that cannot be explained by the other controlling variables. 
Equation (2) describes Model 1, which considers these observations:
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        
     
(2)
We further use time dummies in estimations to account for possible time effects on inflation.
Notice that regressing inflation according to Eq. (2) where we control for variables such 
as government spending, investment, total debt, balance of government budget, and current 
account balance may create problems in the interpretation of the contribution of membership 
to inflation. As Dreyer and Schmid (2017) describe for the case of economic growth, by controlling 
these variables, we may similarly control many channels through which EZ membership or 
its announcement can influence inflation. For example, if government spending impacts inflation 
while simultaneously is a function of EZ membership or its announcement (e.g., EZ countries 
need to respect different rules regarding government spending), one can say that government 
expenditure is a valid channel through which EZ membership or its announcement affects 
inflation. In this case, controlling government spending takes in consideration part of the dummy 
effect on inflation. The same reasoning is valid for investment, total debt, balance of budget, 
and current account balance so that we will refer to them from now on as “channel variables.”
Due to this issue concerning channel variables, we decided to estimate a more general model 
(Model 2), where they are not included based on the following equation:
      (3)
In the next session, we will estimate both models, where the first includes all variables 
as in Eq. (2) and the second disregards channel variables as in Eq. (3). As a result, in the 
first model, membership effects on inflation are restricted to those not coming from the channel 
variables. We would thus expect the parameter of membership on inflation and its announcement 
to be stronger in the second model, where the dummies do not share any effect on inflation 
with other independent variables.
III. Measuring the Impact of EZ Membership on Inflation
A. Initial estimations
To join the common currency, countries must meet many conditions, including inflation 
targets. Thus, in our equations, the dummy variables do not follow a random process. The 
membership variables can be considered endogenous in Eqs. (2) and (3), since they might 
be explained by other latent variables. In this case, the two models cannot be consistently 
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estimated without the use of instrumental variables (see Bun & Klaassen, 2007). The same 
argument is valid for most of our other independent variables, so we use the GMM following 
Arellano and Bond (1991) to run all estimations. Due to the finite sample bias related to the 
GMM, one could suggest the use of the system GMM of Blundell and Bond (1998) instead. 
It has the advantage to generate less bias even though it uses more instruments. However, 
to use it, the number of instruments should be lower than the number of individuals, which 
is not possible in our case5).
It is important to observe that in our data sample, the longer the period, the more EZ members 
exist, and so one can expect to observe a time trend, which could bias estimation results. 
However, the time frame used by our study is not long so that this problem is neglectable. 
For a detailed discussion on time trends and their associated bias, see Baldwin and Taglioni 
(2007) and Bun and Klaassen (2007).
Another issue for the consistency of estimations could be the existence of unit roots. Dreyer 
(2012) and Dreyer et al. (2013) discuss the importance of stationarity for GMM estimations. 
Although our data has a restricted time frame and the likelihood of finding such a problem 
is low, we conducted some tests that ensure panel stationarity of all variables (see Appendix 3).
We used instruments of lag 3 for both estimations of Models 1 and 2. The initial results 
for GMM estimations can be found in Table 1. Estimations perform well with no indication 
of second-order autocorrelation of residuals and no rejection of the Hansen-Sargan test. The 
Wald tests confirm that our independent variables and time dummies are significant to explain 
inflation.
To be conservative, we follow White (1980) and Newey and West (1987) and use for all 
tests of significance the HAC method (heteroscedasticity autocorrelation consistent) to make 
sure that the standard errors of the coefficients are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. 
We are conscious that by using such corrections, we lose precision and may find wider 
confidence intervals6).
Another important observation is that we decided not to reestimate our models without 
nonsignificant variables. The nonsignificant coefficients are left because of the problem 
described by Hendry and Krolzig (2004). These authors show that inference tests may strongly 
depend on the ordering in which we delete the nonsignificant variables.
Model 1 controls for the channel variables. In this model, β4, β6, and β10 are significant 
5) A detailed comparison of these GMM techniques is offered by Roodman (2009), and a lucid discussion on the 
choice of GMM technique in a similar data setting is offered by Dreyer and Schmid (2017).
6) One could also point out the possibility of cross-sectional correlation of disturbances as a possible issue of the 
GMM estimation. If this cross-correlation is high, GMM estimates lose consistency, and results cannot be trusted. 
In order to visualize the possibility of this problem, we study the cross-correlation of disturbances of our estimated 
models which for both are in average in the order of 0.3. Even though a correlation exists, we can argue that 
it is low.
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Model 1 Model 2
Coef. Coef.
β Variables Ann 3 Ann 2 Ann 1 Ann 3 Ann 2 Ann 1













































































































Hansen-Sargan (df. 32) 0.9096 0.9257 0.9243 0.9863 0.9912 0.9918
Autocor. Test (1) −2.71** −2.61** −2.67** −2.59** −2.46* −2.56*
Autocor. Test (2) −1.36 −1.37 −1.41 −1.61 −1.55 −1.36
Wald Coef 216.26*** 232.92*** 209.55*** 42.47*** 34.57*** 216.26***
Wald Time Dum 253.68*** 243.01*** 242.63*** 346.01*** 295.81*** 253.68***
(Notes) (i) Ann 3, Ann 2, and Ann 1 indicate that the announcement variable in the regression computes the prior 
three, two, and one years, respectively, before effective Euro membership.
(ii) Vectors of instruments are constituted of lags of order 3. We use lags of the dependent variable and GDP 
growth as external instruments and lags of all other independent variables in levels and differences as 
endogenous instruments. Significant coefficients are marked in bold.
(iii) Significance: “.” for p-value < 10%, “*” < 5%, “**” < 1%, and “***” < 0.1%
(iv) x for variables not included in the model and () indicates standard error.
(Source) author’s calculations
Table 1. GMM estimation results
at the 10% level. β4 is negative implying that the higher the unemployment, the lower the 
inflation rate. β6 and β10 indicate that the higher the debt and past inflation, the higher the 
inflation rate.
There is no evidence that β1 (economic growth), β2 (investment), β3 (surplus in the budget 
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of the government), β5 (current balance), β7 (government spending), β11 (past investment) and 
β12 (past surplus in the budget of the government) affect current inflation.
We do not find evidence according to Model 1 that the coefficients β8 (Euro membership) 
and β9 (EZ Announcement) are significant. Therefore, the model does not indicate any influence 
of Euro membership or its announcement on inflation.
One could question the results by mentioning the problem of the channel variables and the 
consequent underestimation of the effects of different explanatory variables on inflation, 
including membership effects. In this case, these variables could be seen as the mechanism 
through which membership affects inflation. For example, this could be the explanation for 
why neither the coefficient for current nor lag investment is significant. Thus, to have a broader 
understanding on the effects of EZ membership and its announcement on inflation, we need 
to run estimations without them. That was done in Model 2.
In Model 2, β4 and β10 are significant at the 5% level. β4 is negative, implying that the 
higher the unemployment rate, the lower the inflation will be. On the other hand, β10 indicates 
that the higher the past inflation, the higher the current inflation will be.
There is no evidence that GDP growth affects current inflation (β1 not significant). We do 
not find any evidence according to Model 2 that the coefficients β8 (Euro membership) and 
β9 (EZ Announcement) are significant. Thus, the model does not indicate any influence of 
Euro membership or its announcement on inflation.
B. Robustness and multicollinearity
We test the robustness of our estimates by running simple regressions of inflation on each 
of the independent variables used in the models. We use both panel regression methods, pooling, 
and fixed effects. Table 2 reports the estimated slopes for these regressions.
We can verify a problem related to the robustness of estimates in Model 1. The coefficient 
related to debt is significant, but positive, when simple regressions of inflation on debt indicate 
the opposite sign. Moreover, there are many estimates related to variables that are expected 
to determine inflation that lack significance. Many of these nonsignificant variables also have 
the “wrong signs” when compared to those obtained via simple regressions.
Change in signals and lack of significance of estimates in Model 1 that is overall significant 
can be seen as a clear indication of multicollinearity (Dreyer & Schmid, 2020). That is why 
we decided to calculate the variance inflation factors (VIFs) for the variables. Table 2 has 
different variables with VIFs higher than 37). These higher VIFs are avoided by removing from 
model estimations the lags of investment and balance of the government (INVt-1,i and St-1,i ).
7) As argued by Dreyer and Schmid (2020), in practice, values of VIF significantly higher than 2 could already 
indicate multicollinearity. Here, conservatively, we only cut those variables that present VIFs higher than 3.
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When comparing the results in Table 2 with those estimates of Model 2 in Table 1, we 
cannot verify any change in sign. Moreover, all VIFs for the independent variables used in 
Model 2 are low. This leads us to conclude that there is no evidence of a lack of robustness 
in the estimates of this model.
Variable
Simple Regressions: Slope VIFs



















































(Notes) (i) Significance: ‘.’ for p-value < 10%, ‘*’ < 5%, ‘**’ < 1%, and ‘***’ < 0.1%
(ii) x for variables not included in the model and () indicates standard error.
(Source) Author’s calculations
Table 2. Simple regressions and VIFs
C. Reestimating model 1
We reestimated Model 1, ignoring the lag variables INVt-1,i and St-1,i. We used instruments 
of lag 3 in all estimations presented in Table 3. We do not verify any indication of second-order 
autocorrelation of residuals, and the Hansen-Sargan test does not reject that identification 
requirements are met in all estimations. The Wald tests confirm that independent variables 
and time dummies are significant to explain inflation. All inference results use the HAC method 
to ensure that the variances of coefficients are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation.
Except for the estimate related to DEBTt,i, all significant coefficients β3, β4, and β10 (St,i, 
Ut,i, πt-1,i) have signs that go in line with those that were found with simple regressions. Since 
the coefficient related to debt has the wrong sign, estimations for Model 1 without this variable 
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Model 1 - After VIF Corrections
Including Debt Removing Debt
Coef. Coef.
β Variables Ann 3 Ann 2 Ann 1 Ann 3 Ann 2 Ann 1



















































































































β11 INVt-1,i x x x x x x
β12 St-1,i x x x x x x
Hansen-Sargan (df. 32) 0.9195 0.9376 0.9357 0.9348 0.9496 0.9482
Autocor. Test (1) −2.70** −2.59** −2.66** −2.69** −2.58** −2.66**
Autocor. Test (2) −1.38 −1.38 −1.44 −1.37 −1.37 −1.42
Wald Coef. 145.92*** 172.32*** 179.69*** 162.34*** 163.69*** 184.18***
Wald Time Dum. 366.92*** 327.57*** 375.71*** 378.67*** 330.22*** 375.58***
(Notes) (i) Ann 3, Ann 2, and Ann 1 indicate that the announcement variable in the regression computes the prior 
three, two, and one years, respectively, before effective Euro membership.
(ii) Vectors of instruments are constituted of lags of order 3. We use lags of the dependent variable and GDP 
growth as external instruments and lags of all other independent variables in levels and differences as endogenous 
instruments. Significant coefficients are marked in bold.
(iii) Significance: ‘.’ for p-value < 10%, ‘*’ < 5%, ‘**’ < 1%, and ‘***’ < 0.1%
(iv) x for variables not included in the model and () indicates standard error.
(Source) author’s calculations
Table 3. GMM estimation results
are done. In this case, all significant estimates β3, β4, β5, and β10 (St,i, Ut,i, Currt,i, πt-1,i) have 
signs that go in line with those found in our simple regressions.
Regardless of model setting, according to results, neither EZ membership nor its 
announcement plays a significant role in inflation rates. In the short term, the results diverge 
from those of Cavallo et al. (2015) who identified positive short-term effects of membership 
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on inflation rates in Latvia. However, our work does not concentrate on a single period or 
country as it is the case with Latvia. Our models give a general understanding of the relationship 
between membership and short term inflation for all different European countries. Unlike 
Shiamptanis (2010), who confirmed higher inflation rates for the first countries that joined 
the Euro in 1999, we do not find evidence to support this effect afterward.
Moreover, our results go in line with the findings of Angeloni and Ehrmann (2007), who 
show that inflation differentials have been falling sharply during the 1990s and stabilized already 
before the Euro adoption in 1999 for all 28 EU members, so that the tendency of decreasing 
inflation rates was already gone when the Euro was launched. As shown in the estimations, 
member countries did not have a permanently lower inflation than nonmembers if we consider 
only the time post EZ creation. This result goes in line with the existence of a structural break 
in inflation rates during the 1990s for the entire region and not only Euro members. To some 
extent, the event of the Euro creation may have contributed to this process to the entire region, 
including nonmembers. Thus, our results contradict the notion that membership in a currency 
union is associated with lower inflation as shown by Cham (2011), Kishor and Ssozi (2010), 
and Windberger and Zeileis (2014).
IV. Conclusion
Our aim with this work was to investigate whether EZ membership or its announcement 
had any influence on inflation rates in the period from the adoption of the Euro to 2016.
We collected yearly data from the 28 EU countries from Eurostat, OECD, and the 
International Monetary Fund from 1998 to 2016. We build two models that explain inflation 
in two different ways. The first used channel variables that can be seen as mechanisms through 
which Euro membership affects inflation. The second model did not use these variables.
Given the problem of endogeneity associated with our models, we used the difference GMM 
of Arellano and Bond (1991) to perform estimations. Our results lead to two main conclusions.
First, even though the literature shows for some initial EZ countries that short term inflation 
effects should be observed when a country joins the Euro (Shiamptanis, 2010), this should 
not be the general expectation for countries that join after 1999. The lack of significance of 
the short term variable “announcement” provides evidence. Thus, in general, European countries 
should not fear price hikes from joining the Euro.
Second, our results provide evidence against part of the literature that supports permanent 
differentials in inflation due to EZ membership (see Windberger & Zeileis, 2014). The variable 
EZ is not significant showing that there are no inflation differentials among the 28 EU countries 
due to adopting the Euro8). The discrepancy in the literature may be explained by the data 
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period selected by our sample from 1998 to 2016 (post-Euro adoption). According to Angeloni 
and Ehrmann (2007), inflation rates and their differentials decreased sharply before the Euro 
in the 1990s. Thus, when restricting the data sample only to the period of the EZ, we find 
evidence that the Euro did not lead to lower inflation rates compared to those countries that 
continued to adopt their own national currencies. The event of the Euro may have reduced 
inflation rates in the entire EU region and not only in countries that joined the EZ in 1999. 
In this case, contrary to Cham (2011), Kishor and Ssozi (2010), and Windberger and Zeileis 
(2014), membership in a currency union does not necessarily imply lower inflation rates9).
In summary, for countries joining the EZ after 1999, the occurrence of higher inflation rates 
as consequence of joining the EZ is an exception of what we should expect. Likely, because 
of the period of the analysis (post-Euro adoption) and because inflation rates were already 
converging in Europe before the Euro adoption, our work does not confirm the long-run stylized 
facts of lower long-run inflation contained in the literature.
Furthermore, we verified in our model a significant and positive effect of the lag of inflation 
in current inflation rates. Contrarily, variables such as unemployment rate, the budget of the 
government, and current account decrease inflation. This goes in accordance to the literature 
(Cottarelli et al., 1998; Fakher, 2016).
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Table A1. Literature on inflation rates and their determinants
Appendix 2: Data
Countries
All original 28 members of the EU from 1997 to 2016: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
EZ membership and announcement
We defined the variable EZ membership by setting them equal to 1 in case of membership 
and 0 for nonmembership. The variable announcement (Ann) is set to one in the prior three 
years of EZ membership.
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Total government debt
The total debt was collected from Eurostat, OECD, and IMF because the total series could 
not be collected from only one source. Eurostat has data available since 2005. The rest of the 
data was collected from the OECD and IMF databases. Afterward, we divided by the total 
GDP in current prices to get the data series in percentage terms of the GDP.
The next variables were collected from the International Monetary Fund, World Economic 
Outlook Database, April 2017.
Inflation
According to the IMF database, the data collected on inflation is given by the percentage change 
at the end of period consumption prices (Index) of the different countries.
Current account balance
The current account balance was collected as percentage of the country’s GDP.
Balance of government budget
The balance of government budget was collected as percentage of GDP directly from the time 
series: general government net lending/borrowing.
The next variables were collected directly from the Eurostat home page.
Unemployment
The unemployment rates collected are calculated as the percentage of unemployed persons in 
the total labor force, which is the total of people employed and unemployed. The classification 
of unemployed according to Eurostat is “Unemployed persons aged 15 to 74 who were: a. without 
work during the reference week, b. currently available for work, i.e., were available for paid 
employment or self-employment before the end of the two weeks following the reference week, 
c. actively seeking work, i.e., had taken specific steps in the four weeks period ending with 
the reference week to seek paid employment or self-employment or who found a job to start 
later, i.e., within a period of, at most, three months.”
GDP growth
The GDP growth was collected as the annual percentage change on previous year’s GDP in 
Euros of 2005.
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Investment and government spending
We collected data on gross fixed capital formation and final consumption expenditure of general 
government as percentages of the GDP. One can find these data series under “GDP and main 
components - Current prices [nama_gdp_c].”
Appendix 3: Unit Root Tests with Panel Data
We checked whether all variables of Eq. (2) are stationary by running the tests of unit 
root for panel models of Maddala-Wu (1999) and of Levin, Lin, and Chu (2002). The hypothesis 
of non-stationarity can be rejected for all variables at the 1% significance level except for 




Maddala-Wu Levin, Lin, and Chu
   <0.01 <0.01
  <0.01 <0.01
   <0.01 <0.01
  <0.01 <0.01
   <0.01 <0.01
   <0.01 <0.01
   <0.01 0.0489
  <0.01 <0.01
Table A2. Unit root tests with panel data
